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Abstract 
 
Social comparison theories typically assume a comparable degree of competition between 
commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension.  In contrast, however, the following set 
of studies reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends on their proximity 
to a standard. Studies 1 – 3 test the prediction that individuals become more competitive and less 
willing to maximize profitable joint gains when they and their commensurate rivals are highly 
ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) than when they are not (e.g., #202 vs. #203).  Studies 4 – 6 then 
generalize these findings, showing that the degree of competition increases not only for high 
ranks but also in the proximity of other meaningful standards, such as the bottom of a ranking 
scale or a qualitative threshold in the middle of a scale. Studies 7 – 8 further examine the 
psychological processes underlying the present findings and reveal that proximity to a 






Keywords:  COMPETITION, SOCIAL COMPARISON, DECISION MAKING, SOCIAL 
CAPITAL, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, CHOICE BEHAVIOR 
 
 
 RANKS AND RIVALS  3 
Ranks and Rivals:  A Theory of Competition 
“First one to the tree is the COOLEST-PERSON-IN-THE-WORLD!”  A herd of children 
then stampede towards the tree. Another stampede transpires when one of them shouts, “Last one 
there is a ROTTEN EGG!”  The structure of these childhood games tell us something interesting 
about the dynamics of competition:  competition is not equally distributed among the racing 
children.  In the former race, the children closest to the tree will be more likely than their farther-
behind counterparts to tug and pull at each other’s clothing to preempt their competitors from 
getting to the tree first.  Similarly, in the latter race, the children lagging behind, the would-be 
rotten eggs, will be likely to act more competitively than those farther ahead.  Competition – a 
manifestation of the social comparison process (Festinger, 1942; Festinger, 1954; Hoffman, 
Festinger, & Lawrence, 1954; Whittemore, 1924, 1925; Tesser, 1988) – has generally been 
assumed to be greatest among rivals with commensurate attributes on a relevant dimension 
(Goethals, 1986; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999).  However, we 
propose that competitive behavior intensifies when rivals have high rankings (e.g., #2 vs. #3) 
compared to intermediate ones (e.g., #202 vs. #203).  Moreover, this increased competition 
among highly ranked rivals signifies a more general phenomenon – a tendency for competition 
among commensurate rivals on a relevant dimension to intensify in the proximity of a 
meaningful standard. Such standards are not limited to high rankings (e.g., “the top” standard), 
but may also include rankings that coincide with a bottom or qualitative threshold in the middle 
of such a scale (e.g., #500 on the Fortune 500 vs. #501 – just off it).  
From The Financial Times to Billboard, Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, and U.S. News 
& World Report, rankings permeate our popular culture, and the present analysis uses the 
ranking context to advance our understanding of the social comparison process.  In doing so, the 
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current studies also build on the choice literature that found individuals willingly tradeoff social 
comparison concerns (e.g., disadvantageous inequality) for profit (Bazerman, et al., 1992; 
Bazerman, et al., 1995; Blount & Bazerman, 1996).  We qualify this finding, however, by 
revealing that such tradeoffs become more difficult and less likely for rankings in the proximity 
of a meaningful standard than for rankings farther away from a standard.   
Social Comparison and Competition 
An upward comparison of the self to someone else who is better on a valued dimension 
can be especially painful and foster competitive behavior (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Tesser, 
1988; Tesser, et al., 2000).  In Festinger’s words (1954, p. 126), “competitive behavior, action to 
protect one’s superiority, and even some kinds of behavior that might be called cooperative, are 
manifestations in the social process of these pressures” to reduce such discrepancies.  For 
example, in a classic experiment (Hoffman, et al., 1954), after one participant in a group of three 
began scoring considerably well on a performance task, the other two began to act in ways aimed 
at preventing the higher scorer from gaining additional points.  Such competitive behavior served 
to reduce the relative differences in performance between the higher scorer and the lower ones.   
In order for competition to occur, however, the social comparison must be important to 
the self, and one significant factor that makes social comparisons important to the self is the 
relevance of the dimension at hand.  The Self-Evaluation Maintenance Model (Tesser, 1988; 
Beach & Tesser, 2000), for instance, reminds us that not all upward comparisons are painful.  
Only when the dimension is relevant to the self will the upward comparison be painful and 
increase competitive behavior.  For example, Tesser and Smith (1980) paired acquainted or 
unacquainted individuals in an interactive word identification task and told them task 
performance was either relevant or irrelevant to a valued dimension – verbal skill.  Results 
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showed that participants who thought performance was relevant to their own verbal skill gave 
more difficult clues to their partners than did participants who thought that performance was 
irrelevant.  As Tesser (1988) explains, “when the task is relevant and another’s performance 
threatens to surpass our own, we may take action to prevent that from happening”(p. 444).  
Competition therefore increases when the dimension is relevant to the self. 
Another significant factor that makes social comparison important to the self is the 
commensurability of the reference person.  According to the related attributes hypothesis 
(Goethals & Darley, 1977; see Suls & Wheeler, 2000), we have a tendency to choose a reference 
person who is “close to one’s own performance or opinion, given his standing on characteristics 
related to and predictive of performance or opinion” (p. 265, Goethals & Darley, 1977).   The 
reference person is someone with similar characteristics as the self, and this reference person 
keeps the self motivated to perform just as well, if not better, than this commensurate other. 
Thus, according to both the Self-Evaluation Maintenance Model (Tesser, 1988) and the 
related attributes hypothesis (Goethals & Darley, 1977), social comparison on a mutually 
relevant dimension (e.g., profit) with a commensurate counterpart (e.g., rival) generates 
competition.  We propose, however, that rankings provide important contextual information 
about an additional significant factor that can moderate competition even when the dimension is 
highly relevant and the reference person, or rival, is commensurate.  Moreover, we suggest that 
this effect impacts competition directly, via a basic drive underlying social comparison of 
performance – the unidirectional drive upward (Festinger, 1954).  
Proximity to a Standard and the Unidirectional Drive 
Festinger (1954) posits “there is a unidirectional drive upward in the case of abilities 
which is largely absent in opinions” (Hypothesis IV, p. 124).  This drive is premised on the 
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existence of an obvious, basic, and ubiquitous standard – namely, the top.  For clarity, we take 
our definition of standard from the dictionary:  “An acknowledged measure of comparison for 
quantitative or qualitative value; a criterion” (Webster's, 1998).  In the typical case, “higher” is 
better, because high rankings convey one’s proximity to the standard of reaching “the top” (e.g., 
self and rival ranked #2 and #3).  
However, if the presence of a standard drives social comparison, we might expect the 
unidirectional drive upward to become even stronger in the proximity of the standard – that is, 
near the top. In this case, rivals with high rankings would behave more competitively, while 
rivals with intermediate rankings (e.g., #202 vs. #203), far from the standard, will behave less 
competitively.  Furthermore, if high rankings signify one’s proximity to “the top” standard and 
thereby amplify competition, then other rankings that signify a standard should also increase 
competition.  For instance, competition should also increase where there is a cost to being ranked 
last, or to the extent that one’s rank may not meet a given standard in the middle of the ranking 
scale. Contrary to the view implied by previous research (e.g., Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 
1988), competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension is not static 
but rather dynamic – fluctuating as a function of self-other ranking information.   
Whereas previous research on the rank-order paradigm primarily used rankings to 
measure comparison selection (Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler, 1966), we use rankings to 
ensure rivals’ commensurability and vary the rivals’ distance from the standard, ergo the 
unidirectional drive.  By manipulating the very unidirectional drive on which social comparison 
is based, the present analysis makes two important contributions: showing (1) that high rankings 
can increase competition between rivals to a greater extent than intermediate rankings because 
high rankings signify proximity to “the top” standard and (2) that this “high ranking” effect 
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represents a more general phenomenon, occurring wherever rankings coincide with other 
standards. 
Overview 
Using multiple measures of competition, we predicted that people would become averse 
to trading disadvantageous inequality for extra profit (e.g., an unequal allocation that puts the 
decision maker at a disadvantage compared to another recipient ), rate the pain of social 
comparison as being greater, and report more intense feelings of competition when they and 
their rivals' rankings were proximate to a valued standard (e.g., high rankings) than when they 
were not (e.g., intermediate rankings). To ensure rivals' commensurability (Goethals & Darley, 
1977), paired rivals always occupied two contiguous ranks (e.g., #n vs. #n+1).  We also focus 
only on dimensions that are mutually relevant to the rivals in the context at hand, without 
manipulating relevance. Using a decision-making methodology, Studies 1 – 3 demonstrate that 
competition intensifies with high rankings, Studies 4 – 6 generalize this effect to other rankings 
that signify a standard, and Studies 7 – 8 measured the unidirectional drive upward. 
Study 1 
 One common measure of competition in the payoffs and profit maximization literature 
(e.g., Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Brickman, 1975; Kelly & Thibaut, 1978; Messick & Sentis, 1979; 
Messick & Thorngate, 1967; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) is the tradeoff between profit and 
disadvantageous inequality (Bazerman, et al., 1992; Bazerman, et al., 1994; Bazerman, et al., 
1995; Blount & Bazerman, 1996; Garcia, Tor, Bazerman, & Miller, in press) where participants 
choose between an equal amount as another individual (e.g., self – $500 / other – $500) or a 
more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal amount (e.g., self – $600/ other – $800).  The 
implication of choosing this latter payoff is that individuals willingly forgo social comparison 
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concerns for extra profit (Bazerman, et al., 1992), whereas the more competitive strategy is to 
choose the former suboptimal equal payoff.  
We predicted that more individuals in the high rankings condition than in the 
intermediate rankings condition would choose a less lucrative but equal payoff (e.g., 5% self - 
5% other) over a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal one (7% self – 25% other).  We 
also included a control condition (Wheeler, 2000), where no ranking information was provided.  
If the control condition were to produce results akin to the intermediate rankings condition, we 
could infer that the high rankings amplify competition, as predicted.  If it were to resemble the 
high rankings condition, on the other hand, we could infer that intermediate rankings somehow 
deflate competition.   
Participants 
A total of 162 undergraduates (85 female and 77 male) from two Midwestern universities 
received $8 for completing a 45-minute survey packet or volunteered at the library. 
Procedure 
 In a between-subjects design, the high rankings and intermediate rankings conditions 
were entitled “Top 500 Nonprofits” and read as follows, “Imagine that you are the CEO of a 
nonprofit organization that is ranked (#1 / #101) in donation earnings.  You are thinking about a 
fundraising joint venture with another nonprofit organization that is ranked (#2 / #102).  Income 
from donations will depend on whether or not you enter the joint venture.  Strategy A: Without a 
joint venture, your nonprofit organization’s donations will increase by 5% and the other 
nonprofit’s donations will increase by 5% - OR - Strategy B:  With a joint venture, your 
nonprofit organization’s donations will increase by 7% and the other nonprofit’s donations will 
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increase by 25%.”  Participants were then asked to choose one option. The control condition 
simply omitted ranking information on donation earnings. 
Results and Discussion 
 To test the prediction that high rankings amplify competition relative to intermediate 
rankings (and the control condition), we performed a binary logistic regression by using the 
following contrast:  2 (high rankings), -1 (intermediate rankings), and -1 (control).  This contrast 
was significant (B = -.46, Wald = 13.2, p<.001), suggesting that the high rankings condition 
significantly differed from the average of both intermediate rankings and the control.  Only 54 
percent in the high ranking condition (n=50) maximized profit compared to 79 percent in the 
intermediate ranking condition (n=56) and 86 percent in the control condition (n=56).  We also 
conducted follow-up individual comparisons in the context of their own set of orthogonal 
regressions.  As predicted, a significant contrast emerged between the high and intermediate 
rankings (1, -1, 0: B = -.57, Wald = 7.0, p<.01), controlling for its orthogonal pair (1, 1, -2:  B = -
.35, Wald = 5.9, p<.05).   Moreover, as expected, the contrast between the intermediate rankings 
and control was not significant (0, 1, -1: B = -.25, Wald = .96, p>.32), controlling for the 
orthogonal one (2, -1, -1:  B = -.46, Wald = .13.4, p<.001).  
Because the data from the control condition were much closer to the intermediate 
ranking condition than to the high ranking condition, the implication is that high rankings 
enhanced the social comparison process.  Furthermore, the effect of rankings on competition 
transpired, although ranking information was arguably irrelevant to the nonprofit organization’s 
goal of maximizing donation income.  Indeed, the participants recognized this fact, as a majority 
maximized joint gains across all conditions.  Even so, the high rankings condition augmented 
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social comparison concerns sufficiently to make the tradeoff between disadvantageous inequality 
and profit a bit more difficult. 
Study 2 
Although high rankings appear to amplify social comparison, one possible explanation is 
that individuals in the high rankings condition of Study 1 chose suboptimal rates of donation 
growth to preserve the visibility of their nonprofit organization.  Hence, their choice could be a 
profit maximizing choice in the longer term that takes into account visibility effects, instead of 
the result of competitive feelings brought about by social comparison per se.  Study 2 addressed 
this issue by removing the choice of payoffs and simply asking participants how competitive 
they would behave toward their rival.  Study 2 also lowered the rankings in the high rankings 
condition to show that proximity to the top, instead of actually being at the top, suffices to 
generate the effect.  To link the choice results in Study 1 directly to social comparison, Study 2 
also captured ratings of the pain of social comparison (Bazerman, et al., 1992; Brickman & 
Bulman, 1977).   
Participants 
A total of 49 undergraduates (22 females and 27 males) at a Midwestern university 
received $8 for completing a 45-minute packet of surveys. 
Procedure 
 Participants read, “Imagine that you are the CEO of a nonprofit organization. You are 
thinking about a fundraising joint venture with a rival nonprofit organization. Income from 
donations will depend on whether or not you enter the joint venture.”  High and intermediate 
rankings contexts were presented randomly:   “Suppose that you have the (#9 / #209) rank title in 
donations earnings and the other nonprofit has the (#10 / #210) rank title.”  Two questions 
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followed each context, “How competitive would you feel toward the other nonprofit? (1 = Not 
Competitive, 7 = Very Competitive)” and “How painful would it be if the other nonprofit 
surpassed you in the rankings? (1 = Painless, 7 = Painful).” 
Results and Discussion 
 As predicted, individuals indicated they would feel more competitive towards the rival 
nonprofit when they were ranked #9 and the rival nonprofit #10 (M=4.37, SD=1.85) than when 
ranked #209 and the rival #210 (M=3.65, SD=1.81, F(1,48) = 13.3, p<.01).  Individuals similarly 
indicated that they would feel more pain knowing that their rival surpassed them in the context of 
high (M=4.20, SD=1.80) versus intermediate rankings (M=3.35, SD=1.63, F(1,48) = 12.9, 
p<.01).  The correlation between competitiveness and the pain of social comparison was highly 
significant in the high (r=.68, p<.001) and intermediate rankings (r=.71, p<.001) conditions 
alike.  Taken together, these results buttress the social comparison account – namely, that highly 
ranked rivals who are proximate to “the top” standard feel more competitive and anticipate more 
social comparison pain, as compared to rivals ranked farther away from this standard. 
Study 3 
 While Studies 1 and 2 suggest that high rankings intensify competition relative to 
intermediate ones, Study 3 directly tested the hypothesis that competition increases with the 
proximity to the top, following our claim that the unidirectional drive upward intensifies as a 
function of this proximity.  Study 3 tested this prediction systematically by varying the rivals’ 
distance from the standard.  Study 3 also used a within-subjects design to underscore the strength 
of individual decision makers' preferences, as some researchers feel that such designs enable 
individuals to make more consistent decisions (Camerer, 1995).  
Participants 
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 A total of 30 undergraduates at a Midwestern university responded to an e-mail invitation 
for an online study.  A total of 100 randomly selected e-mail addresses from the undergraduate 
student directory were e-mailed but a few bounced-back, yielding an approximate response rate 
of 30 percent.  All online participants volunteered; they did not receive course credit or pay.  We 
also note that online data collections for decision-making experiments tend to produce similar 
results as in-person ones (Birnbaum, 1999), with the added benefit of capturing a more diverse 
sample (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).   
Procedure 
 In a within-subjects design, participants read about a poker tournament:  “Imagine that 
you are playing in a one-day poker tournament with 500 players. For the final round, you are 
deciding whether or not to team up with one of your rivals:  Strategy A: If you play solo, your 
tournament earnings will increase by 5% and your rival's by 5% – OR – Strategy B: If you play 
as a team, your tournament earnings will increase by 10% and your rival's by 25%.”   
Participants were then asked, “In the following cases, which strategy would you pursue?”  
Participants then read verbatim, “Before the final round, you are ranked #3 in tournament 
earnings and your rival is ranked #4...,” and then indicated their strategy.   Participants responded 
to four randomly presented iterations of the same question that varied the rankings (self vs. 
rival):  #3 vs. 4, #6 vs. 7, #12 vs. 13, and #24 vs. 25.  
Results and Discussion 
 We conducted a GEE analysis1 to test the prediction that competitive behavior would 
increase with the rivals’ proximity to “the top” standard.  The score statistic for the GEE analysis 
was significant (χ2(3)=15.81, p<.01).  We then conducted a linear contrast with the following 
weights:  -3 (3 vs. 4), -1 (6 vs. 7), 1 (12 vs. 13), and 3 (24 vs. 25).  This predicted linear pattern 
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was significant (χ2(1)=14.02, p<.001) while the two orthogonal patterns were not (quadratic: 1,-
1,-1, 1; χ2(1)=1.84, p=.18; cubic: -1, 3, -3, 1; χ2(1)=.84, p=.36).  Only 20 percent maximized 
joint gains when ranked #3 and their rival #4, compared to 23 percent when ranked #6 and rival 
#7, 47 percent when ranked #12 and rival #13, and 70 percent when ranked #24 and rival #25.  
See Figure 1.  Thus, Study 3 supports the prediction that competition increases as the rivals 
become increasingly proximate to “the top” standard. 
Beyond High Rankings 
Studies 1 – 3 show that high rankings intensify competition relative to intermediate 
rankings and that competition grows increasingly stronger as rivals become more proximate to 
“the top” standard.  However, we argued that high rankings should intensify competition because 
they indicate how far one is from a standard.  Therefore, if this standard-based model is true, as 
Studies 1 – 3 suggest, then other rankings that signify a standard should likewise amplify 
competition compared to rankings that do not.  Incidentally, this predicted pattern is somewhat 
reminiscent of the striking finding that bronze medalists are happier than silver ones (Medvec, 
Madley, & Gilovich, 1995).  However, the present analysis focuses on social comparison and 
competition, whereas the medalist study focused on counterfactual thinking (e.g., Roese & 
Olson, 1995) following a competition. 
Study 4 tested thus the prediction that competition will be greater when the rivals had 
either high rankings or bottom rankings that coincide with a valued standard, compared to 
intermediate rankings.  Since previous research (Smith & Insko, 1987) suggests that academic 
achievement is an important dimension to our participant pool (i.e., students), Study 4 
mainpulated one’s rank at a university as an indicator of academic achievement.  Using class 
rankings, we tested the prediction that those who are proximate to an academic standard (ranked 
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top or last in the class) would behave more competitively than those who are not proximate to 
one of these standards (e.g., ranked in the middle). 
Study 4 
Participants 
 A total of 68 undergraduates at a Midwestern university participated in an online study, 
and the recruiting process is described in Study 3.  Two hundred e-mails were sent, and the 
response rate was approximately 34 percent. 
Procedure 
Participants read, “Imagine that you are studying for a final exam that is worth half of 
your grade, and you are deciding whether to study with another classmate. Your decision will 
directly affect your performance on the final exam and indirectly affect your final grade in the 
course, cumulative GPA, and rank at the University.”  Three questions varied the rivals’ rankings 
and were randomly presented in a within-subjects design:  “Suppose that you are ranked (#5 / 
#101 / #499) out of 500 at a university and the other classmate is ranked (#6 / #102 / #500). 
What would be your decision?   Study Alone:  Your percentage on the final will increase by 5% 
and the classmate’s by 5%  – OR –  Study with Classmate:  Your percentage on the final will 
increase by 10% and the classmate’s by 20%.” 
Results and Discussion 
 Results from a GEE analysis supported the prediction that participants would prefer a 
more competitive strategy when the self and rival were ranked highly or at the bottom of the 
class than when ranked in the middle.  The score statistic for the GEE analysis was significant 
(χ2(2)=17.22, p<.001).  We also conducted a follow-up contrast analysis with the following 
weights to test this quadratic pattern: 1 (high rankings condition), -2 (intermediate rankings 
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condition), and 1 (bottom rankings condition).  The predicted quadratic pattern was significant 
(χ2(1)=17.02, p<.001) while the orthogonal linear pattern was not (-1, 0, 1: χ2(1)=2.13, p=.14), 
suggesting that the intermediate rankings condition significantly differed from the high and 
bottom rankings conditions, which did not significantly differ from each other.  A total of 59 
percent in the high ranking, 81 percent in the intermediate ranking, and 69 percent in the bottom 
ranking conditions maximized exam percentage points.  See Figure 2.  Thus, it appears that 
rankings exert their effect through the standards they signify, as the social comparison process 
intensified when a bottom ranking coincides with the standard of being last in the class. 
Study 5 
Although Study 4 supports our standard-based model, one might argue that social 
comparison concerns only increase at the end points of a distribution, a possible implication of 
range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965, 1995).  Accordingly, Study 5 used the setting of the 
Fortune 500, which is only a segment (Top 500) of the entire distribution of publicly traded 
companies.  We predicted that competition would be greatest when rivals were ranked #3 and #4 
and when ranked #500 and #501 (off the list), compared to ranks #103 and #104.  To illustrate 
the robustness of the effect, Study 5 also measured competition with a “flipped” tradeoff where 
profit was coupled with equality and the unequal payoff was advantageous but less lucrative. 
Participants 
 A total of 72 undergraduates (33 females and 39 males) at two Midwestern universities 
were recruited at the library and volunteered to participate in a brief study.  Research assistants 
targeted students who were studying by themselves, and the response rate was generally very 
high (approximately 90 percent). Groups of students were always avoided because of the 
tendency for study groups to confer and compare their responses during the task. 
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 Procedure 
 In a between-subjects design, participants in the high, intermediate, and bottom rankings 
conditions read, “Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that is ranked (#3 / #103 / #500) 
on the prestigious Fortune 500, and you are thinking about a possible joint venture with a rival 
company ranked (#4 / #104 / #501 – just off the list).  Profits will depend on whether or not you 
enter a joint venture.”  Participants then chose “Strategy A:  Without a joint venture, your 
company’s profits will increase by 5% and your rival’s profits will increase by 1%.” – OR –  
“Strategy B:  With a joint venture, your company’s profits will increase by 6% and your rival’s 
profits will increase by 6%.” 
Results and Discussion 
 To test the prediction that competition would be greater among rivals ranked #3 and #4 
and #500 and #501 (just off the Fortune 500), compared to rivals ranked #103 and #104, we 
performed a binary logistic regression by using the following contrast:  1 (high rankings), -2 
(intermediate rankings), and 1 (bottom rankings).  The contrast was significant (B = -.53, Wald = 
7.5, p<.01), suggesting that the high rankings condition significantly differed from the 
intermediate rankings condition but not from the bottom rankings condition.  Only 39 percent of 
the participants in the high rankings condition (n=26) and 50 percent of the participants in the 
bottom rankings condition (n=22) chose the more profit maximizing equal payoff, compared to 
79 percent in the intermediate rankings condition (n=24).  See Figure 3. We also conducted 
follow-up individual comparisons in the context of their own set of orthogonal regressions.  As 
predicted, a significant contrast emerged between the high and intermediate rankings conditions 
(1, -1, 0: B = -.90, Wald = 7.8, p<.01), controlling for the orthogonal contrast (1, 1, -2:  B = .14, 
Wald = .66, p=.41).   The contrast between the intermediate and bottom rankings was also 
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significant (0, 1, -1: B = .67, Wald = 4.1, p<.05), controlling for the orthogonal one (2, -1, -1:  B 
= -.38, Wald = 4.8, p<.05).   
Thus, competition can also increase when a bottom ranking coincides with a standard - in 
this case, just missing the Fortune 500 criterion - showing again that the ranking effect is not 
about high rankings alone.  This data pattern also refutes a psychophysical counter-explanation 
for the effect found here.  Psychophysics research (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Volkmann, 1936; 
Zipf, 1949) suggests that a one unit distance between the contiguous ranks of #3 and #4 may 
seem much larger than a one unit distance between a ranking of #103 and #104.  Hence, one 
might argue that perhaps competition only increases amidst high rankings where the difference is 
greater. Yet, as Study 5 (and Study 4) suggest, this psychophysical account alone cannot explain 
this ranking effect, because the difference between the ranking of #500 and #501 is actually 
smaller than the ranking of #103 and #104 yet a point of increased, not decreased, competition.  
Again, the standard matters, not the ranking per se. 
Study 6 
 Study 5 also implies, however, that competition can increase even amidst intermediate 
rankings, since the “bottom” rank of #500 of the Fortune 500 is also “intermediate” with regard 
to the rest of the population (or even the Fortune 1000).  Because Study 5, however, did not 
make this characteristic of the Fortune 500 explicit, participants may have implicitly considered 
the list to be a complete distribution rather than a segment thereof. Study 6 thus seeks to 
underscore that the location of the ranking on the scale – top, bottom, or somewhere in the 
middle – is incidental; what matters is whether that ranking signifies a standard.  In Study 6 we 
therefore tested the prediction that competition increases in the proximity of any valued standard, 
regardless of its overall rank.  
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Participants 
 A total of 73 undergraduates at a Midwestern university participated in an online survey, 
and the recruiting process is described in Study 3.  Two hundred e-mails were sent, and the 
response rate was approximately 36 percent.  
Procedure 
    Participants were assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions.  Participants in 
the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition read, “Imagine that you are playing in a one-day poker 
tournament with 500 players. Everyone who finishes in the Top 100 gets a $100 bonus.”  Then 
all participants in this condition answered three randomly presented questions, “Suppose that, 
before the final round, you are ranked (#2 / #50 / #100) in tournament earnings and your rival is 
ranked (#3 / #51 / #101 - just outside the bonus cut-off). How competitive would you feel toward 
the rival?”  At this point, participants indicated their response on a 7-point scale (1 = Not 
Competitive, 7 = Very Competitive). 
Participants in the Top 200 Control Condition read the identical scenario, except that 
“Everyone who finishes in the Top 200 gets a $100 bonus.”  In this condition, being ranked #100 
and the rival #101 was well within the bonus area.  Participants in the Top 200 Get Bonus 
Condition read the identical scenario as the Top 200 Control Condition, except that the rankings 
were modified.  The self was ranked (#2 / #100 / #200) and the rival was ranked (#3 / #101 / 
#201 - just outside the bonus cut-off). 
Results and Discussion 
 We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA to test the predicted CONTEXT by RANK 
interaction on the reported competitive feelings.  The within-subjects factor RANK was 
significant (F(2, 140)=16.2, p<.001) while the between-subjects factor of CONTEXT was not 
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(F(2, 70)=.54, p = .59).  However, as predicted, the CONTEXT by RANK interaction was 
significant (F(4, 140)=6.17, p<.001), suggesting that the standard determines whether or not the 
ranking incites feeling of competitiveness.  See Table 1 for means and standard deviations. 
In the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition, a U-shaped pattern emerged.  Participants expressed 
feeling more competitive when ranked highly (#2 vs. #3) and when ranked at the bonus standard 
(#100 vs. #101 –just outside the bonus cut-off), compared to when ranked in the middle (#50 vs. 
#51).  Thus, when a standard is at hand (e.g., missing the bonus cut-off), competition increases. 
The Top 200 Control Condition showed a different pattern.  Because being ranked #100 with a 
rival ranked #101 was well within the bonus standard, participants expressed lower levels of 
competition in this ranking position.  Finally, participants in the Top 200 Get Bonus Condition 
showed the same pattern of results as those in those in the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition.  
Participants expressed feeling more competitive when ranked #2 and rival #3 and when #200 and 
rival #201 –just outside the bonus cut-off, compared to when ranked #100 and rival #101.   
Thus, the standard, not the location of the ranking, determines competition.  The very 
rankings that were a point of contention in the Top 100 Bonus Condition (#100 vs #101) became 
a point of cooperation in the other two conditions, and planned comparisons indeed confirmed 
this pattern.  Competition was significantly greater when participants were ranked #100 and the 
rival #101 in the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition than in the Top 200 Control Condition 
(t(46)=3.70, p<.01) and the Top 200 Get Bonus Condition (t(44)=4.14, p<.001), which did not 
significantly differ from each other (t(50)=.35, p=.73).  Moreover, because these rankings were 
assigned from a tournament population pool of 500, we can also infer that competitive feelings 
do not always subside with intermediate rankings, as standards placed amidst intermediate 
rankings can also amplify competition.  Study 6 therefore further underscores that wherever the 
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standard is, even in the middle of a distribution, competition will intensify.  Put differently, what 
matters most is the location of the standard and proximity to the standard; the ordinal rank itself 
is incidental. 
The Polarizing Unidirectional Drive  
 Across multiple measures of competition (e.g., the choice between profit and 
disadvantageous inequality, the choice between profit and advantageous inequality, the pain of 
social comparison ratings, and feelings of competition), the preceding studies showed 
consistently not only that competition increases with high rankings, but also that this high 
ranking effect is a more general phenomenon.  Any rankings that signify a standard will amplify 
competition.  But what is it about standards that increase competitive concerns?  We thus begin 
to address the question of the underlying psychological mechanism. 
While previous research suggests that competition is greatest when the dimension and 
reference person are, respectively, relevant and commensurate to the self (e.g., Goethals & 
Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988), that research assumes that “unidirectional drive upward” is fixed 
under these circumstances.  The present analysis, however, calibrates the strength of this drive by 
manipulating the rivals’ distance from the standard, holding constant the relevance of the 
dimension and commensurability of the rivals. According to the proposed model, the 
motivational drive upward – namely, the importance of doing well – becomes increasingly 
stronger as rivals’ approach a standard.  
It is possible, however, that standards do not impact the motivational drive upward 
directly but, rather, do so indirectly by impacting the perceived commensurability of rivals.  
Although contiguous ranks were assigned to guarantee commensurability, contiguous ranks at 
different locations on the ranking scale may not all be equally commensurable. Specifically, a 
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social comparison perspective (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988) might suggest that rivals 
who are proximate to a standard are perceived to be more commensurate (e.g., #2 and #3) than 
rivals further away from the standard (e.g., #202 and #203).  On the other hand, a possible 
extension of the psychophysics research described above (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Volkmann, 
1936; Zipf, 1949) might lead to the opposite prediction – namely, that competition increases in 
the proximity of a standard because differences between contiguous ranks are perceived to be 
greater than among less proximate rankings.  
Significantly, Studies 4 – 6 showed that a pure psychophysics mechanism (i.e. in relation 
to the top of the ranking scale) cannot account for the effect of standards on competition. 
Nevertheless, the possible extension of the psychophysical intuition to the more general case of 
standards leads to a prediction diametrically opposed to the traditional social comparison 
account. The latter, social comparison account, would propose increased commensurability of 
rivals (or decreased differences between them) in the proximity of standards as a potential 
mediator of the effect of proximity on competition. The psychophysics account, on the other 
hand, would propose increased differences between rivals (or their decreased commensurability) 
in the proximity of standards as a potential mediator of the standard effect. 
Studies 7 and 8 therefore begin to explore the psychological mechanism underlying the 
effect of proximity to a standard on the unidirectional drive upward. Specifically, we examine 
whether the this effect is mediated directly by the importance of doing well, or indirectly through 
the perceived commensurability (either increasing or decreasing) of the rivals. 
Study 7 
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Study 7 measured both the importance of doing well and the perceived difference in rank.  
The prediction was that high rankings, relative to intermediate ones, would be associated with an 
increase in the importance of doing well, regardless of perceived difference in commensurability. 
Participants 
 A total of 34 full-time employees (10 female and 24 males) concurrently enrolled in a 
part-time MBA program at a Midwestern university participated in a questionnaire study as part 
of a class exercise.  All those in attendance participated.   
Procedure 
 In a between-subjects design, participants were assigned to either a high rankings or 
intermediate rankings condition.  Participants read a modified version of the Fortune 500 
scenario: “Imagine that you are the CEO of a Fortune 500 company.  Your company is currently 
ranked (#5 / #405), and you are thinking about whether or not to enter a lucrative joint venture 
with your arch-rival whose company is ranked (#6 / #406).”  Participants were given no 
information, regarding payoffs or otherwise.  Participants then responded to two questions about 
the importance of doing well (“How important is it for you to out-compete your arch-rival?” 1 = 
Not Important, 7 = Very Important) and the perceived difference in rank (“So your company’s 
rank is (#5 / #405), and your rival’s company is (#6 / #406).  How big is the difference in rank?”  
1 = Small, 7 = Large). 
Results and Discussion 
 A MANOVA was conducted on the importance and difference variables by condition.  
Results showed that participants in the high rankings condition felt that it was significantly more 
important to out-compete one’s rival (M=5.33, SD=1.40) than did participants in the intermediate 
rankings condition (M=3.53, SD=1.78, F(1,32)=10.4, p<.01).  As for the difference variable, 
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participants in the high rankings condition (M=2.40, SD=1.55) were not significantly different 
from those in the intermediate rankings condition (M=2.53, SD=1.84, F(1,32)=.05, p=.83).  
Thus, the implication is that high rankings, signaling proximity to the standard, underscored the 
importance of doing well; no support was found for the perceived difference in rank.  In fact, 
even when we control for difference as a covariate variable, the high rankings condition is still 
significantly different on the importance measure from the intermediate rankings condition 
(F(1,31)=14.2, p<.01).   
Incidentally, these results also corroborate our operationalization of commensurability as 
contiguity of ranks.  Here, whether one is ranked highly or intermediately, the perceived 
difference in rank does not vary, at least not in this between-subjects design.  However, one 
could still argue that the difference account might still play a significant role where people can 
readily compare differences between high and intermediate rankings (Bazerman, et al., 1992; 
Camerer, 1995; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, Bazerman, 1999), which make the difference 
account more transparent.  Thus, while Study 7 linked the importance of doing well and 
proximity to the standard in the absence of any significant change in the perceived 
commensurability of the rivals, Study 8 used a within-subjects design to test whether the 
availability of a comparison between different ranking position leads to changes in perceived 
commensurability that, in turn, might also mediate the effect of proximity to a standard on 
competition. 
Study 8 
 Study 8 used a within-subjects design where participants could readily compare the 
difference between high and intermediate rankings.  We asked participants to respond to a 
question about competition on a scale that ranged from cooperative to competitive (slightly 
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different from the strictly competitive measure used in Studies 2 and 6), along with questions 
about the importance of doing well and the perceived difference in rank.  Additionally, instead of 
always having people one rank above their rival, we also included a reciprocal control condition 
where people are one rank below their, still commensurate, rival. We predicted that the 
importance of doing well, even when controlling for the perceived difference in 
commensurability, would be directly related to competitive behavior.  No significant differences 
were predicted for being ranked one above or below the rival. 
Participants 
 A total of 84 undergraduates (49 females and 35 males) participated at a Midwestern 
university.  Participants were recruited at the library and asked to volunteer for a brief 
questionnaire. 
Procedure 
 In a within-subjects design, participants read about having high rankings on the first 
page, “Imagine that you are a rock star, and you are ranked #3 out of 500 in sales revenue 
according to Rolling Stones Magazine.  Imagine further that you are deciding whether or not to 
do a duet album with your arch-rival:  a rock star who is ranked #4.”  Participants then responded 
to the questions about competition (“How cooperative or competitive would you feel toward 
your arch-rival?” 1 = Cooperative, 7 = Competitive), the importance of doing well relative to 
rival ( “How important would it be for you to out-compete your arch-rival?”  1 = Not Important, 
7 = Very Important), and the perceived difference in rank (“So, you are ranked #3, and your arch-
rival is ranked #4.  How big is the difference in rank?” 1 = Small, 7 = Large).  On the second 
page, participants read about intermediate rankings, “Now, imagine that you are ranked #303 out 
of 500…[arch-rival] is ranked #304.”  Participants then responded to the three questions above.  
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The order of presentation was also counter-balanced such that the first page was about 
intermediate rankings. 
 In addition to this within-subjects factor (RANK: high / intermediate), we also controlled 
for ranking position as a between-subjects factor (POSITION:  one above / one below) in which 
the self was ranked just one below the rival (e.g., self #4 / rival #3 and self #304 / rival #303).  
Results and Discussion 
 We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on the competition, importance, and 
difference measures by RANK and POSITION.  As expected, there was no significant RANK x 
POSITION interaction for any of these three measures (All p’s>.3).  Thus, the implication is that 
these ranking effects are the same whether just one above or below one’s rival.  However, 
participants did express more competitive behavior with high rankings (M=4.93, SD=1.55) than 
intermediate ones (M=3.27, SD=1.64, F(1,82)=52.4, p<.001), felt it was more important to do 
well with high rankings (M=4.95, SD=1.66) than intermediate ones (M=3.72, SD=1.80, 
F(1,82)=26.6, p<.001), and felt the difference in rank was greater with high rankings (M=3.92, 
SD=2.11) than intermediate ones (M=2.18, SD=1.55, F(1,82)=41.3, p<.001).   These results 
suggest the people become more competitive and feel it is even more important to do well with 
high rankings than intermediate ones.  We also note that, in this within-subjects design, 
participants not surprisingly recognized the difference in rank as being greater with high 
rankings than intermediate ones. 
 To examine the unique relationship importance has with competition, irrespective of the 
perceived difference in commensurability, we conducted two sets of partial correlations focused 
on the ratings in the high rankings and intermediate rankings conditions.  For the high rankings 
condition, we correlated importance and competition while controlling for difference.  As 
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predicted, the relationship between importance and competition was strong and highly significant 
(r=.60, p<.001), suggesting that participants’ importance ratings in high rankings condition were 
directly related to their competition ratings, even while controlling for the perceived difference in 
commensurability.  We also conducted the identical analysis using the participants’ rating in the 
intermediate rankings condition.  Again, importance and competition were significantly 
correlated, even when controlling for the perceived difference in commensurability (r=.44, 
p<.001). Thus, Studies 7 and Study 8 together suggest that proximity to the standard directly 
impacts the importance of doing well and that the importance of doing well has a direct impact 
on competitive behavior; this psychological mechanism is not contingent upon a perceived 
difference in commensurability. 
General Discussion 
The social comparison literature has generally assumed that the level of competition 
between commensurate rivals on a mutually relevant dimension is fixed (e.g., Goethals, 1986; 
Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988).  However, across multiple measures, across various 
contexts of interest to our participants, and across between and within-subjects designs, the 
present analyses reveal how varying the rivals’ distance from the standard can in turn vary this 
fundament process and competition itself.  Studies 1 – 3 showed that high rankings, relative to 
intermediate ones, intensify competition, as indicated by an increase in competitive feelings, an 
increase in the pain of social comparison, and a reduction in the willingness to trade off 
disadvantageous inequality to maximize joint gains.  Studies 4 – 6 revealed that this apparent 
"high ranking" effect is a far more general phenomenon, due not to rankings per se but rather to 
the standards that such rankings represent, as competition intensifies only when rankings 
coincide with a standard. Studies 7 – 8 began examining the psychological mechanisms 
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underlying this standard effect, providing evidence that proximity to the standard directly 
impacts the unidirectional drive upward itself, as measured by the importance of doing well.   
Theoretical Implications 
 Our ranking analysis fundamentally changes the conventional view of competition.  
Social psychologists have long recognized the importance of factors such as the relevance of the 
dimension at hand (Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1988) and the commensurability of rivals (Goethal 
& Darley, 1977).  Yet, social psychologists, as well as experimental economists (e.g., Kagel & 
Roth, 1995), have generally assumed that the “unidirectional drive upward” is fixed, either 
present or absent (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988), when relevance 
and commensurability are held constant.  Our ranking analysis, however, introduces a new factor 
germane to our understanding of competition: the distance from a standard.  By varying rivals’ 
distance from a standard, we directly manipulate the central unidirectional drive and, in turn, the 
degree of competitive behavior. 
Although the proximity to the standard largely and dramatically appears to lead to a 
direct impact on the unidirectional drive upward, we do note when people are under “joint 
evaluation” (Bazerman, et. al, 1992; Camerer, 1995), where people can systematically compare 
differences as in Study 8, the perceived difference in commensurability was perceived to be 
larger amidst high rankings than intermediate ones.  Although Studies 4 – 8 dismiss a pure 
psychophysics mechanism, an interesting question for social comparison theory remains.  That 
is, according to the related attributes hypothesis (Goethals & Darley, 1977), the more 
commensurate the rivals, the greater the competition.  However, the exact opposite pattern 
appears in Study 8.  The more commensurate rivals were intermediately ranked ones, and they 
were less competitive.  Thus, one interesting implication is that one’s proximity to a standard can 
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become so polarizing, the upward motivational force so strong, that issues of commensurability 
matter less in the proximity of a standard. 
Despite these theoretical implications, one could question whether our decision making 
methodology is appropriate for the hypotheses examined in the present studies. As Daniel 
Kahneman (2000) explained, however:  “The answer is that choice…is the fruit fly of decision 
theory.  It is a very simple case, which contains many essential elements of much larger 
problems.  As with the fruit fly, we…hope that the principles that govern the simple case will 
extend in recognizable form to complex situations (p. xi, Kahneman, 2000).”  We believe this 
statement legitimately applies to the trade-offs examined in the present analysis. 
Implications for Social Capital 
 The present analysis also helps contribute to a broader discourse within the social 
sciences on social capital (see Putnam, 2000) – the value of social networks (e.g., Burt, 1992).  
While economists, political scientists, sociologists, and others have been vocal on this issue, 
social psychologists have been mute on this debate, if not unaware, even though cooperation – 
the currency of social capital – is a topic with deep roots in social psychology.  
 The present analysis, however, broaches the possibility that rankings may have 
unintended, perhaps even deleterious, effects on cooperation.  Our results suggest that people 
with high ranks are much less willing to cooperate, even when such collaborations have the 
potential to maximize profit or some other utility. Notably too, as mentioned above, we have 
demonstrated this effect in artificial situations.  While the effect size appears large under these 
conservative circumstances, one can only imagine how these results might understate the effect 
in the real world where many highly ranked individuals are even more likely to be competitive as 
a function of self-selection than intermediately ranked individuals.  Given this gross confound, 
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making ranking information more salient among highly ranked real world rivals would likely 
further impede mutually beneficial collaborations.   From a social capital perspective, rankings 
can thwart the development of cooperative networks, and the negative correlation between 
competition and socializing with others (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003) further 
underscores this point. 
Conclusion 
Rankings that coincide with a standard intensify the social comparison process to a 
greater extent than rankings that do not.  While the theoretical implications help uncover a new 
direction in social comparison research, the findings reported here simultaneously broaden our 
understanding of competition.  The degree of competition between commensurate rivals on a 
mutually relevant dimension is not fixed but rather dynamic, as “the unidirectional drive 
upward” fluctuates according to the rivals’ distance from a standard.  On a broader level, the 
present analysis uncovers a potentially important disadvantage of today’s prevalent ranking 
culture for beneficial cooperation: rankings can sometimes impede progress on the very 
performance dimensions they seek to enhance. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. Because the binary logistic regression assumes that the responses (Strategy A / Strategy 
B) are independent, we could not use this procedure in this within-subjects design.  The 
appropriate statistical test to analyze these correlated binary responses is the Generalized 
Estimating Equations (GEE) Analysis (Liang & Zeger, 1986).  We conducted our GEE 
analyses by using the REPEATED statement in the GENMOD procedure in SAS 
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Table 1 
 
Means, standard deviations, and cell sizes for competitive feelings by condition and rank. 
   
RANK #2 vs. 3 #50 vs. 51 #100 vs. 101 #200 vs. 201 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Poker:  Percent maximizing joint gains by rankings. 
Figure 2.  Class Rank:  Percent maximizing joint gains by rankings. 
Figure 3.  Fortune 500:  Percent maximizing joint gains by rankings.  
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Figure 3 
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